NSA tries to subvert TOR
Posted by: Timothy Weaver on 10/04/2013 03:44 PM
[
Comments
]
The latest Snowden documents suggest the National Security Agency is able to peel back the veil on a small fraction of Tor users.
“Once the computer is successfully attacked, it secretly calls back to a FoxAcid server, which then performs additional attacks on the target computer to ensure that it remains compromised long-term, and continues to provide eavesdropping information back to the NSA,” Schneier said.
According to Schneier, the secret to FoxAcid’s success is its ability to target vulnerabilities in the Firefox browser. Another secret set of servers, code-named Quantam, live on the Internet backbone. Schneier said that they were placed there by the NSA because of secret partnerships with telecommunications companies in the United States. Quantam is quicker to react to web requests than standard web servers are.
“By exploiting that speed difference, these servers can impersonate a visited website to the target before the legitimate website can respond,” Schneier wrote, “thereby tricking the target’s browser to visit a FoxAcid server.”
Apparently subverting Tor has been a frustrating target for the NSA as indicated by the title of one presentation: “Tor Stinks.”
“Once the computer is successfully attacked, it secretly calls back to a FoxAcid server, which then performs additional attacks on the target computer to ensure that it remains compromised long-term, and continues to provide eavesdropping information back to the NSA,” Schneier said.
According to Schneier, the secret to FoxAcid’s success is its ability to target vulnerabilities in the Firefox browser. Another secret set of servers, code-named Quantam, live on the Internet backbone. Schneier said that they were placed there by the NSA because of secret partnerships with telecommunications companies in the United States. Quantam is quicker to react to web requests than standard web servers are.
“By exploiting that speed difference, these servers can impersonate a visited website to the target before the legitimate website can respond,” Schneier wrote, “thereby tricking the target’s browser to visit a FoxAcid server.”
Apparently subverting Tor has been a frustrating target for the NSA as indicated by the title of one presentation: “Tor Stinks.”
Comments
